Russophrenia – The Split of the Media Mind and the Clash of Megalobbies
The term “Russophrenia” is derived from combining “Russo-” (Russia) and “schizophrenia.” It describes a situation in which two contradictory images of Russia are simultaneously promoted: that it is collapsing and losing the war, yet also poses a serious threat to Europe and the global order. To my knowledge, the term was first used about a decade ago by Brian MacDonald in an RT article titled “Russophrenia – a disease in need of a cure,” where he defined it as the belief that Russia threatens the world despite facing severe financial difficulties. Later, Mikhail Molchanov, citing MacDonald in an Asia Times article titled “Trump-Putin Summit: Russophrenia Explained,” highlighted how Western media simultaneously believe in Russia’s collapse and its potential for global domination. Similarly, Bill Totten wrote in 2019 in an article titled “Has the US Lost Military Superiority to Russia?” describing it as a psychological phenomenon where Russia’s downfall is predicted alongside its superiority over the West. Russian media have also adopted this idea, using it to mock the West’s “schizoid” attitude toward their country.
“Russophrenia” has become a significant propaganda phenomenon, particularly due to the war in Ukraine. In the West, it is now used to point out two contradictory images of Russia in war propaganda. Western media portray Russia as a weak and failing player, incapable of conquering Donbas, to motivate Ukraine and NATO to sustain war efforts, while simultaneously depicting it as a dangerous force that could “overrun” Poland and Germany, thereby maintaining NATO and EU unity despite catastrophic economic losses. These opposing narratives are deliberately deployed: the first boosts Ukraine’s morale and strengthens Western support, while the second instills fear to ensure political and military cohesion. When a “motivational” effect is needed, stories of Russia’s imminent collapse are emphasized, but when disciplining Europe to support Ukraine and militarize is required, tales of the Russian threat to Scandinavia, Poland, or Germany take center stage. Even Russian propaganda, often referencing the “nuclear club” as a last resort, sometimes contributes to this narrative.
The same media can promote both portrayals simultaneously or highlight one as needed.When I shared this thesis on X, Nikola Mikovic compared it to the concept of “doublethink” from Orwell’s 1984. Comments on the platform ranged between supporting one or the other view of Russia—as a victor or a country on the brink of collapse. Thus, Russophrenia prevails even on social media.
“Russophrenia” is common in propaganda: it simultaneously mocks the opponent, convinces the public of its defeat, and instills fear to mobilize against the “greatest threat.” This approach resembles narratives about the USSR, where stories of collapse and domination by the “evil empire” were intertwined.In the Ukraine war (2022–2025), “Russophrenia” is a key element of the information conflict.
The BBC (September 26, 2025) highlights Russia’s economic troubles (sanctions, ruble decline) but warns of nuclear threats. NATO emphasizes only the dangers, ignoring weaknesses, while The New York Times discusses the Russian military’s stalemate in Donbas. British media now stress Russia’s weaknesses to motivate the US and NATO to continue the war against Russia in Ukraine, believing in a possible victory during or after the war through a “time of troubles.”
This divide goes beyond propaganda—it affects Western leaders. For example, Trump initially believed Ukraine might not be losing but wasn’t winning either, only to later support the idea—after meetings in London where British intelligence presented data on Russia’s economic struggles—that Ukraine, with NATO and US aid, could exhaust Russia. The goal is to weaken Russia, even to the point of sparking chaos or revolution.The contradiction between a weak and powerful Russia may seem illogical, but media use it to boost morale and justify militarization. However, this is not just propaganda—there are two schools of thought. One, aligned with global financial lobbies, sees Russia as a target due to its resources and seeks its defeat through Ukraine. The other, tied to the real economy, focuses on China and Iran and seeks peace to exploit Russia’s resources. This conflict of interests between two megalobbies is not a clash between America and Europe, as Europe is an object, not a subject, in geopolitical games. It is a competition within the global Anglo-Saxon elite, where two megalobbies exist. The first, through globalist media, pushes black-and-white images of Russia—its collapse or invasion of Europe—while the conservative minority offers a more balanced and pragmatic approach. The former act as crusaders, the latter as traders.
