Branko Radun: Trump’s “Dollar Solution” to the Gaza Problem Serves Israel’s Interests

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Question 1: How has the lack of consistent international support and institutional protection over decades affected the current state of Palestine and the ability of local authorities to plan for long-term development?
Answer: To understand the context, consider that Israel, roughly the size of Serbia’s Vojvodina region, is a military, nuclear, and technological powerhouse. Gaza, by contrast, is essentially an overcrowded refugee camp, smaller than many Serbian municipalities, squeezed between Israeli territory and the sea, with no natural resources. Israel, a key U.S. ally on par with the UK and above even NATO members, dominates the region. The Palestinians, though ethnically Arab and financially supported by the Arab world, cannot counter the U.S.-Israel alliance, as Arab states prioritize their relations with the U.S. and Israel over supporting impoverished Palestinians. This leaves Palestinians without meaningful international protection, under Israeli control, and without sovereignty over their economy, infrastructure, or security. In the current war between Israel and Hamas, the very survival of Gaza’s population is at risk. The Palestinian Authority, geographically and politically split between Gaza and the West Bank, is dysfunctional. Hamas’s rise has dragged Palestinian society into a cycle of terrorism, violence, and misery. Even outside the conflict devastating Gaza, this means chronic poverty, unemployment, and reliance on humanitarian aid. Without U.S. pressure on both sides and as long as Hamas remains a military and political force, peace is unattainable.
Question 2: What are the main geopolitical obstacles to a greater U.S. role in Gaza’s reconstruction, and how could the U.S. build a regional coalition without losing credibility in the Arab world?
Answer: The primary obstacle is the fragile Western consensus on supporting Israel. A wave of recognitions of Palestine as a state, led by the UK, signals to Israel a weakening of Anglo-Saxon support, but it hasn’t yet changed realities on the ground. For the first time, resistance to Israel’s policies toward Palestinians is growing in Washington, London, and European capitals, but Israel remains a critical U.S. and NATO ally. The U.S. must balance Arab pro-Palestinian sentiment, Egypt’s security concerns along Gaza’s border, Turkey’s anti-Israel rhetoric, and Iran’s ambition to exploit Middle Eastern chaos. The U.S. has tried building coalitions with economic incentives and promises of Palestinian rights, but Hamas has rejected such financial overtures, embracing a self-destructive jihadist ideology. Maintaining credibility in the Arab world is nearly impossible without addressing the refugee crisis and ending the war, yet Israel refuses any concessions while Hamas remains a factor. The U.S. belief that money can resolve deep-seated ethnic and religious conflicts is naive.
Question 3: What are Gaza’s comparative advantages for economic and infrastructural reconstruction, and what are the key obstacles to realizing these potentials in the short term?
Answer: Gaza is a narrow strip of land along the sea, essentially an overcrowded refugee camp that has grown into a city, with no natural resources. Its only advantages are its small size, which could theoretically allow for rapid reconstruction, and its coastal access, which could support the development of a port, fishing industry, or, in the long term, tourism. Before the conflict, Gaza survived on Arab donations and jobs in Israel. Now, amid Israel’s total war against Hamas, these potentials are pure fantasy. The war’s high casualties, destroyed infrastructure, and constant threat of attacks or Hamas activity make projects like ports or tourist hubs unfeasible. Without peace and the lifting of blockades, nothing can be achieved in the next 1–3 years. Reconstruction would take decades, with the constant risk of new conflicts.
Question 4: How would a U.S. intervention in Gaza’s reconstruction affect Israel’s security interests, and is it possible to simultaneously satisfy Palestinian aspirations for independence?
Answer: Israel would demand that the U.S. guarantee its security, which, for Israel, means control over Gaza to prevent “terrorism,” including through military interventions. This undermines Palestinian independence, as U.S. support would be contingent on Israeli approval. There’s no consensus in Israel for concessions—Netanyahu is beholden to radical coalition partners who sustain his power. In practice, Israel won’t allow Palestinian independence, even if the world recognizes Palestine, and Palestinians won’t accept a new occupation under a U.S. flag without the return of refugees. This leads to continued conflict, not peace.
Question 5: What institutional changes within the Palestinian political system are necessary for sustainable reconstruction, and how could international support encourage a transition of power?
Answer: The critical change is the elimination of Hamas as a political and military force, as this is Israel’s condition for ending the war. The Palestinian Authority must distance itself from Hamas and propose constructive plans for sustainable peace, acknowledging Israel’s superiority backed by the U.S. and the West. Could the UN mediate and facilitate reconstruction? The Trump administration distrusts intermediaries, especially the UN, and Israel rejects foreign observers on its or Palestinian territory.
Question 6: What would be the best financing model for Gaza’s reconstruction, and how can it ensure funds reach local communities rather than elites or foreign firms?
Answer: A realistic model combines U.S.-led international funds, contributions from Arab states and the EU, and public-private partnerships for quick results. Israel would need to approve projects, with the U.S. overseeing fund distribution while Arabs and the EU provide the money. Without strict anti-corruption measures, funds would be siphoned off by politicians or Western corporations, regardless of the amount. Directing funds to communities via digital channels is the only way to ensure Gaza benefits, but history shows this rarely happens.
Question 7: What are the main geopolitical risks if the U.S. takes a leading role in Gaza’s reconstruction, and how could Washington build a regional coalition without jeopardizing local actors’ interests?
Answer: Risks include resistance within the West, where leftists and Muslim communities lead pro-Palestinian protests, as well as competing interests of Arab states. Egypt fears instability on its border, Turkey leverages anti-Israel rhetoric, Saudi Arabia balances normalization with Israel against public pressure, and Iran could escalate tensions. The U.S. is seen as Israel’s ally, so intervention would be perceived as neocolonialism. Washington could offer economic incentives (e.g., investments in Egypt and Jordan) and promises of Palestinian rights, but without pressure on Israel to lift blockades or address the refugee crisis, any coalition would be fragile and short-lived.
Question 8: How should a development strategy for key infrastructure (water, sanitation, energy, port) be tailored given the need for peace, and what are realistic timelines?
Answer: The strategy must first address urgent needs: ending the conflict and providing food, water, and medicine. Only then can infrastructure like water and electricity be tackled. These projects require peace and the lifting of Israel’s blockade. In ideal conditions, water and energy could be restored in a few years, and a port in about five. In the current war, with religious and geopolitical tensions, reconstruction could take decades, and without lasting peace, everything risks destruction.
Question 9: What role do the right of return and refugee rights play in a U.S. reconstruction model, and can a program prevent further displacement?
Answer: The right of return is central to Palestinians but would likely be sidelined in a U.S. model, as Israel categorically rejects it. Without addressing this, neither Palestinians nor Arabs would accept the plan. The program would focus on integration within Gaza to prevent further displacement through local projects, but without resolving the right of return or compensating for lost property, it fails to address long-standing demands. In wartime conditions, reconstruction is nearly impossible, and peace is a prerequisite for progress.
Question 10: What are the ethical and political pitfalls of a U.S. “protectorate” in Gaza, and what mechanisms could prevent aid from becoming a tool of domination?
Answer: Pitfalls include using aid for political control, media propaganda portraying the U.S. as a savior, and demilitarization that ignores Israel’s occupation. This could benefit Palestinians by replacing Israeli control with American involvement, but it would reinforce perceptions of neocolonialism and spark resistance. Trump’s proposal to turn Gaza into a tourist destination, ignoring refugees, has already been rejected.
Question 11: How would a shift in U.S. policy toward Palestine affect domestic U.S. politics and relations with Israel, and is there a coalition to support an ambitious program?
Answer: A shift would face fierce opposition in Congress, dominated by the pro-Israel lobby (AIPAC), as well as from business, media, and voters (evangelicals, older Jewish communities). However, younger voters, progressive Democrats, and some liberal Jews increasingly support Palestinian rights, shifting public dynamics. This pro-Palestinian push, driven by “Soros-backed” green left and Antifa movements, has gained traction through protests and university blockades (similar trends are seen in Serbia with Antifa and green groups). Balancing Israel’s interests requires pressuring Netanyahu for concessions without losing U.S. domestic support.
Question 12: What criteria would measure the success of a U.S. intervention in Gaza, and which combination of measures offers the best chance for sustainable peace?
Answer: Success would be measured by lasting peace, political stability, infrastructure reconstruction, and poverty reduction. Eliminating Hamas as a political factor is critical, as it’s Israel’s condition for ending the war, but this must not equate to Palestinian capitulation. Without ending the war, addressing the right of return, and lifting blockades, Trump’s “dollar-driven” approach won’t lead to a lasting or just solution.
Branko Radun is a political analyst who has been engaged in foreign policy and geopolitics for decades.
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